. S-boxes in the network are defined as a mapping We shall consider S-boxes that are keyed using one of the following methods 2 :
1. selection keying: the key bits may be used to select which S-box mapping from a set of mappings will be used for a particular S-box, and ¦ e " ! .
Target S-box:
A target S-box is the S-box under examination within the network.
The cryptanalysis targets one S-box at a time in order to find the key bits associated with that S-box.
Target Sub-Key: The key bits associated with the target S-box are referred to as the target sub-key.
Ciphertext Sub-Block:
A ciphertext sub-block is a block of s ciphertext bits which are associated with a particular S-box in the last round of the network. These may or may not be contiguous in the output block depending on whether there is a final permutation after the last round of S-boxes. There are q g r t s
sub-blocks in a ciphertext block.
Sub-Block Mapping:
A sub-block mapping is generated by considering a mapping 
¡ . Key-Dependent Degeneracy
The cryptanalysis exploits the highly probable occurrence of degeneracy in subblock mappings. In general, if an s # s mapping is randomly selected, there is a non-zero probability that it is degenerate. It will be shown that subblock mappings within the network often have a much higher probability of being degenerate than that of a randomly selected mapping. In such cases, by maintaining a count of the occurrence of such degeneracies for each possible target sub-key, the correct sub-key can be derived with high probability. We refer to the consistent occurrence of degeneracy for the correct target sub-key as keydependent degeneracy. Key-dependent degeneracy is very high in networks with a small number of rounds and decreases as the number of S-box rounds is increased.
In the most difficult cryptanalysis scenario, each S-box in the network has a number of associated key bits that are independent of the other key bits in the network. The cryptanalysis begins by selecting a target S-box in the first round of the network. An appropriate number of chosen plaintexts are selected so that the target sub-key may be determined with reasonable statistical confidence.
Subsequently, the remaining first round S-boxes are targeted and the associated key bits determined. Once the first round key is known, the appropriate partial encryption can be used in targeting the second round of S-boxes with chosen inputs. The attack may proceed by stripping off rounds of S-boxes as their key bits are determined. As the unknown portion of the network decreases in size, the number of required chosen plaintexts to discover the target sub-key decreases significantly.
Consider the target S-box to be in the first round. In general, an SPN may be represented by the first round S-boxes, the last round S-boxes, and an inner network, as in Figure 2 £ has a significant probability of being degenerate in one or more bits.
If function
£ has a high probability of being degenerate in a particular input,
¡
, then there is a high probability that all s inputs to a last round S-box are degenerate in ¡ as well. When this occurs, the input to the last round S-box is a degenerate mapping from the target S-box output and the corresponding subblock mapping from the target S-box output to the ciphertext sub-block will be degenerate. However, since the target sub-key is unknown, the outputs of the target S-box and, hence, the inputs to the sub-block mapping are not known. Table 2 . Sub-block Mappings Corresponding to Sub-keys examine the full sub-block mapping is also easily analyzed for degeneracies in the partial mappings.
When considering partial mappings from a trial of 16 chosen plaintexts, the bits that are not included as part of the mapping under examination must be fixed.
Hence, for any 3 bits of the target S-box output, there are two £ mappings to be examined: one corresponding to the fourth bit equal to 0 and one corresponding to Example: Consider the example of Table 1. A portion of the table is reproduced in Table 3 in order to illustrate a case where, if the first 2 inputs to the subblock mapping for ¡ are fixed at
, the sub-block mapping
Often, the correct sub-key can be easily distinguished with fewer plaintextciphertext pairs by analyzing partial mappings rather than the full sub-block mapping. Although randomly selected mappings with fewer inputs have a higher probability of being degenerate, in many cases the key-dependent degeneracy is significant enough to allow identification of the correct key.
. Effectiveness of the Algorithm
In general, it is hard to derive explicitly the complexity or the probability of success of the attack. The effectiveness of the cryptanalysis depends largely on the properties of the S-boxes and the permutations used. In analyzing the attack, it is of interest to determine (1) the likelihood that different target sub-keys cannot be distinguished and (2) the likelihood of the inner network being degenerate with a probability significantly greater than is expected for a randomly selected mapping. If we cannot distinguish between the correct sub-key and all incorrect sub-keys or if degeneracy occurs with the same frequency as expected in a random mapping, then the cryptanalysis will be unsuccessful.
Distinguishing Between Keys
It is quite possible that a particular trial will display degeneracies for the subblock mappings of different sub-keys, one of which may or may not be the correct sub-key. The success of the attack relies on the correct sub-key displaying degeneracy more often than incorrect sub-keys. Assuming that the probability of degeneracy is large and a suitable number of chosen plaintexts is available, only under exceptional circumstances will it be impossible to distinguish between the correct key and an incorrect key. The relationship between S-box mappings which will allow this to occur and the subsequent likelihood of randomly selected Sboxes being indistinguishable is given in the following theorem and corollary. This is divided by the number of possible bijective mappings to give (1) above.
From Corollary 1, it is apparent that, if an S-box is keyed by selecting between two randomly selected mappings and assuming a sufficient number of chosen plaintexts to allow distinguishing, it is very unlikely that the two S-boxes will be indistinguishable and it will only occur for the constrictive relationship of Theorem 1. For example, if , the probability of two randomly selected
S-boxes being indistinguishable is
.
Degeneracy in Random Mappings
Success of the cryptanalysis requires that the probability of degeneracy for the full and partial sub-block mappings is significantly different than the degeneracy of a random mapping so that the correct sub-key is obvious for the number of chosen plaintexts available. It is of interest therefore to determine the probability of a randomly selected 0 1 ¡ 2 mapping being degenerate. As the number of rounds in the network increase, the probability of degeneracy approaches this value and it becomes infeasible to distinguish the correct sub-key from wrong sub-keys.
Theorem 2:
The probability of a randomly selected 0 ¡ mapping being degenerate in one or more inputs is given by:
where ¡ ¤ represents the probability of the mapping being degenerate in " particular inputs and is given by:
Proof:
To see how (2) is derived, consider first the probability of a random 
Considering now the random W Y X à mapping, since all output functions of the mapping are independent, the probability of all`outputs being degenerate in b particular inputs is given by (3) . Using the principle of inclusion-exclusion from set theory [10] and noting the symmetric nature of the degeneracy, the probability of the W c X d mapping being degenerate in one or more inputs is simply given by (2) . The probability of degeneracy for different size mappings is given in Table 4 .
Y à . Experimental Results
This section highlights some of the results of the cryptanalysis applied to different Table 6 . Experimental Degeneracy Probabilities with DES S-boxes and random S-boxes. In Figure 4 the measured degeneracy probabilities for the full c i e c and the partial bits change is very useful in diffusing changes through the network and thereby minimizing degeneracies. This property is unlikely to occur in randomly selected S-boxes and, therefore, it is not surprising that the frequency of key-dependent degeneracy is higher in networks where the S-boxes are simply randomly selected.
Consider the number of chosen plaintexts required to determine a first round target sub-key using the full e ¡ sub-block mapping. We can expect the number of sub-block mappings which must be analyzed before observing a degeneracy to be given by
. In cases where degeneracy occurs with a much higher probability than expected for random mappings, it will typically take only a few occurrences of degeneracy to establish the correct key. Considering that analyzing a sub-block mapping requires chosen plaintexts, the correct target sub-key is clearly distinguishable.
If the probability of degeneracy approaches the probabilities listed in Table 4 , it might take many times more than one degeneracy occurrence to clearly distinguish the correct key. For example, analyzing p e c partial mappings, it was found that the correct target sub-key was determined in 7 of 8 experiments, each experiment using 1.6 million chosen plaintexts, for the 8 round network using DES S-boxes.
Similarly, it takes on the order of 1.6 million chosen plaintexts to distinguish the correct target sub-key for the 12 round network with random S-boxes.
Ỳ`
. Applicability of the Attack
Thwarting the Attack
There are a number of ways to minimize the impact of the attack. The rapid diffusion or avalanche of bit changes is effective in decreasing the probability of degeneracies occurring. There are several techniques that can be used to improve the diffusion in an SPN. These include:
(1) using larger S-boxes (2) using S-boxes with good diffusion, and (3) using a diffusive linear transformation (LT) as the interconnection between rounds of S-boxes.
The effect on the degeneracy probability as a function of the number of rounds in the network is illustrated in Figure 6 . Experimental results are presented for randomly selected S-boxes which have good diffusion are capable of taking small input changes and converting these to a larger number of output changes. The S-boxes used in Figure 6 guarantee that a one bit input change will result in an output change of at least two bits.
A diffusive linear transformation can be generated by having each input to a round of S-boxes be determined by the sum of a number of output bits from the previous round output. For example, the linear transformation used in Figure 6 is derived by adding a parity bit to each bit after applying the permutation of Table 5 where the parity bit consists of the XOR sum of all bits.
small number of rounds, both random degeneracy probabilities are much smaller than the experimental probabilities and, hence, may be considered to be negligible.
In this case, it is clear that the degeneracy probabilities for the SPN using e S-boxes are much smaller and therefore more chosen plaintexts are required to successfully cryptanalyze by exploiting key-dependent degeneracy.
Application of Attack to DES
In an attempt to determine the effectiveness of the attack on the Data Encryption Standard, we ran extensive simulations of the attack on DES. It was found that no degeneracy could be detected beyond 4 or 5 rounds, suggesting that DES is very resistant to this form of cryptanalysis. Other cryptanalysis techniques, such as differential or linear cryptanalysis, have been much more successful against
DES.
This result is not surprising in light of the good diffusion characteristics of DES.
For example, DES S-boxes have good diffusion of bit changes (since a one bit input change must result in at least a two bit output change) and the effects of bit changes are spread to a large number of S-boxes in the next round due to the expansion operation and the asymmetric S-boxes.
Comparison to Differential Cryptanalysis
Cryptanalysis of SPNs using key-dependent degeneracies takes advantage of the weaknesses in the dynamic properties of ciphers. These weaknesses can also be typically exploited by differential cryptanalysis. It is difficult to directly compare the effectiveness of the two attacks since the exact complexity of both attacks is difficult to determine. Differential cryptanalysis, for example, requires knowledge of a highly probable characteristic in order to estimate the complexity of the attack.
We have found, however, that cryptanalysis using key-dependent degeneracy can be successful on networks of many rounds and the approach is very systematic and involves no detailed analysis of the SPN before execution. Conversely, while it is likely that differential cryptanalysis could be successful on SPNs of many rounds, performing the attack requires careful analysis of the difference distributions of the S-boxes in order to determine the most probable characteristics that may be used in executing the attack. This is not necessarily a simple process and it is conceivable that it could make differential cryptanalysis much more difficult to implement.
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Conclusion
We have presented a novel cryptanalysis of an important class of private key block cryptosystems referred to as Substitution-Permutation Networks. The attack exploits the likely occurrence of key-dependent degeneracy within the network to determine target sub-keys associated with individual S-boxes. Experimental 22 results indicate that the cryptanalysis is very effective on networks up to a large number of rounds. As well, it is noted that strong S-box diffusion, as in the DES S-boxes, has significant effect on minimizing the success of the attack as the number of rounds in the network is increased. 
